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  In this paper I will offer an overview the evolution of civil liberties in the United 
States.  These liberties, I argue, were meant to protect individuals from unwarranted 
exercises of power from the government, but ultimately were not intended to hamper the 
government’s ability to carry out basic government functions, such as self defense.  Next, 
I examine the parallel evolution of the ability of the executive to exercise broad ranging 
powers in pursuit of foreign policy, especially in regard to self defense. After that I argue 
that the current policy not necessarily represent the administration choosing self defense 
over an individual’s civil liberties. Rather, it represents the notion that at a fundamental 
level, a state will always choose to pursue foreign policies designed to protect itself, and 
that even the domestic legal institutions that have evolved in the United States recognize 
that fact.
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Recent news reports of a natural born expatriate American citizen targeted for 
assassination by the American government has resulted in a major argument over whether 
the government of the United States has the authority to undertake such actions.  The 
targeting of an American citizen by his own government seems to contradict not just 200-
plus years of American ideals, but also appears to fly in the face of recent Supreme Court 
decisions that uphold the civil liberties of U.S. citizens and detainees alike in the post-
9/11 era.  The fact that this action was undertaken by the current Democratic 
administration is all the more surprising, since many observers had assumed that it would 
pursue policies, if not diametrically opposite of the previous Republican administration, 
then at least more nuanced and reserved in their goals. 
 Yet the current administration‟s decisions and actions should not be surprising.  In 
fact, the relative continuity in certain policies across administrations of differing political 
persuasions demonstrates the role that domestic institutions, especially legal institutions, 
can play in creating and perpetuating foreign policy.  As I will demonstrate, the current 
controversy amply demonstrates that foreign policy is especially subject to institutional 
forces. 
 Over the course of the history of the United States, two separate but parallel legal 
traditions have developed that amply demonstrate both the paramount importance given 
to the rights and liberties of American citizens, and the near absolute ability of the 
executive branch to conduct foreign policy and safeguard the safety and security of the 
country.  The collision of these two traditions is brought into stark relief by the Obama 
administration‟s recent attempts to justify the killing of an American citizen in a foreign 
country through the use of unmanned Predator drones.  While the issue at hand raises 
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questions regarding the political wisdom of such actions, it also demonstrates that even 
the most liberal states in regard to the liberty and autonomy of their citizens are 
conditioned and act in ways that are intended to safeguard the safety of the country even 
at the expense of the their citizens. 
 In this paper I will first briefly review two competing explanations of state actions 
in the international system: realism and liberalism, using some recent works as examples 
of each.  These theories offer competing explanations based on assumptions of the 
international system and where a state‟s core interests originate.  Second, I will offer an 
overview the evolution of civil liberties in the United States.  These liberties, I argue, 
were meant to protect individuals from unwarranted exercises of power from the 
government, but ultimately were not intended to hamper the government‟s ability to carry 
out basic government functions, such as self defense.  Next, I will examine the parallel 
evolution of the ability of the executive to exercise broad ranging powers in pursuit of 
foreign policy, especially in regard to self defense.  After that I will argue that the current 
decision to authorize the killing of an American citizen in a foreign country does not 
necessarily represent the administration choosing self defense over an individual‟s civil 
liberties.  Rather, it represents the notion that at a fundamental level, a state will always 
choose to pursue foreign policies designed to protect itself, and that even the domestic 
legal institutions that have evolved in the United States recognize that fact. 
FOREIGN POLICY  
 
Examining the foreign policy of a state is a complex process and relies on one‟s 
notion of where a country develops its priorities.  Many realists, for example, portray the 
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state as a single unitary actor whose primary characteristics are related to the space it 
occupies and the relative power it wields, with defensive realists admitting to small 
influences of certain domestic factors.  Liberalism, on the other hand, can believe the 
state=s foreign policy is a result of a morass of self-interested bureaucracies, or as the 
cumulative influence of various interest groups, or as the particular configuration of a 
leader‟s preferences.   Regardless, liberal theories of foreign policy regard domestic 
factors as paramount in determining a state‟s actions and priorities. 
Liberalism 
In order to determine how states act in classical realism all that matters is the 
distribution of resources in the system and a state‟s placement in that system.  Under such 
a conception the foreign policy of a state is almost a foregone conclusion.  In order to 
protect itself a state must accumulate resources and deploy them in the state‟s best 
interest.  All that is left for states and their leaders to do is to determine how to achieve 
this.  Thus, Krasner can argue from his „statist approach‟ that the state is relatively 
autonomous from society and can thus be treated as a homogenous rational actor.  For 
Krasner the state is a relatively simple artifact, which dovetails nicely with a 
parsimonious realist theory of international relations.  For policy making purposes, the 
state is reduced to the presidency and the State department which have a “higher degree 
of insulation from specific societal pressures and a set of formal and informal obligations 
that charge them with furthering the nation‟s general interest” (Krasner 1978, 11).   
The problem with this is that not all states act as they should according to this 
notion of the state.  If all that mattered was a state‟s particular configuration in the 
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system, then similar states in similar situations should make similar decisions, yet they 
often do not.  Neoclassical, defensive and other strands of more recent lineage of realism 
thus contend that this theory is incomplete and therefore inaccurate.  To account for these 
differences between state actions, some feel, one must take into account variables that 
make the states different, such as internal domestic arrangements or the idiosyncrasies of 
leaders. 
Thomas Christensen, for example, sees a similar state to Krasner, in that the state 
determines what its goals are, generally independent of other groups (such as interest 
groups and political parties).  The problem comes from implementing these goals.  For 
Christensen the state is enmeshed in a web of social and political relations that make the 
state pursue a more hostile policy that it might otherwise prefer.   
In this view the state is now caught between two systems, the international and 
the domestic.  Yet, the state itself is still relatively simple and is able to determine 
independently its own goals, which are still related to its placement and survival in the 
international system, i.e., its security (chapter 2).  The greater complexity comes from the 
more complex context of the state, rather from any greater complexity in the state itself.  
In order to examine its foreign policy decisions, what is necessary is something akin to a 
process tracing approach.  The goals that the state is trying to achieve are there and 
determined by the appropriate officials, but cannot be independently executed.   
Realism 
Necessarily then, this foreign policy analysis becomes more complicated.  Yet, 
this complexity is not the result of any inherent problems in determining what the state 
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should or is trying to do.  This less parsimonious approach comes from recognizing the 
greater complexity of the situation that the state is in.  Hence this variant of realism 
retains some of classical realism‟s simplicity because it retains a simple view of the state, 
and the goals that the state is trying to achieve.  
For Fareed Zakaria, American national interests are still rooted at the systemic 
level.  He notes that in “the anarchic, non-heirarchical international environment, states 
are driven by the system‟s competitive imperative” (Zakaria 1998, 29).  But the straight 
forward implications of this classical interpretation of realism produces results that do not 
match the historical record (Zakaria 1998, 32).  He corrects for this by making a 
distinction between national and state power.  National power is the power that a state 
actually possesses as a result of its place in the international system. However, he notes 
that the power that a state can actually exercise is limited by the internal construction of a 
state‟s government and the extent to which a state (and its leaders) define their 
responsibilities and goals (p. 38-9).  The state‟s leaders are thus simply engaged in an 
ongoing struggle with society to carry out the state‟s primary security related goals.  
Thus, much like Christensen argues, the foreign policy goals of the state are relatively 
easy to determine.  The greater complexity lies in the context of the foreign policy 
making apparatus.  Note that these simple views of the states and its foreign policy easily 
jibe with the realist tenet that security is the primary job of the state.  Any loss in 
realism‟s parsimony comes from examining how these goals are implemented.  This, 
however, is not the case with liberal notions of international relations. 
Using realist theories to approach foreign policy and foreign policy decisions, 
while having varying degrees of parsimony, still does not result in a highly accurate 
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understanding of international relations.  Treating the state as a single entity, at least for 
the purposes of determining state goals and national interests, results in contradictions 
over how states may change course in their interactions with other states.  Liberal notions 
have stepped in to try and fill this void.  Liberalism adds to our understanding of 
international relations and foreign policy by not assuming a simple set of security related 
goals for the state, but assumes that these goals themselves are fluid and subject to 
various influences.  Thus, liberalism opens up the range of things to be examined by 
opening up the policy making process itself by adding such variables as preferences, 
institutions, bargaining, and structures to the mix.  It does this, however, at the cost of 
simplicity.  The increased complexity of the state, and, indeed, different notions of what 
the state does, can potentially give us a better understanding of how states conduct 
themselves.  But by now using variable notions of what a state is, this approach may at 
the same time increase the risk of faulty analyses by examining inappropriate items. 
In Jack Snyder‟s Myths of Empire we now encounter a state that is far more 
complex in its foreign policy decision-making.  In this book Snyder examines the 
problem of over-expansion by examining which groups influence the foreign policy 
making process.  Due to bargaining and log-rolling between groups that have an interest 
in a particular decision, states can sometimes engage in activity that exceeds what any 
single domestic group might wish to engage in. 
Implicit in this examination of the influence of domestic actors on foreign policy 
is a very specific definition of the state.  For Snyder, rather than being an entity that is 
struggling to carry out its systemically determined goals, the state is now a very weak 
entity.  In fact, it barely seems to exist at all.  Rather, government foreign policy 
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decisions seem to be merely the aggregation of self-interested groups, especially in the 
legislative setting.   
One might argue that Snyder does indeed look at different institutional 
arrangements, as he posits that unitary, democratic and cartelized systems produce 
different foreign policy outcomes (Snyder 1991, 31-55).  In fact, what he is doing is 
looking at how different institutional arrangements can blunt the foreign policy desires of 
conglomerations of interest groups.  These institutional arrangements do not seem to 
participate actively in the policy process.  It is the interest groups that are most heavily 
influencing the output.  The government is more of an institutional arrangement that 
impedes to one degree or another how successful these groups are.  
Snyder‟s assumptions of the state differ greatly from realist notions.  We thus are 
examining two different outcomes, because there are two different inputs.  For the realist 
the input is a set of predetermined goals that are achieved to varying degrees, while for 
the liberal the input is very much variable according to the desires of the dominant 
groups.  Because of this we should then expect a wider array of outcomes (foreign 
policies) for this type of analysis.    
In addition, there is now an added layer of complexity.  Now the analyst must 
determine what goals a state is trying to achieve.  For Snyder, these goals come from 
interest groups and are mediated by domestic structures (Interestingly, Snyder assumes a 
uniform reaction on the part of other states, that they seek to counter belligerent behavior.  
For the other states, their actions are determined by their need to ensure their survival!).  
Snyder‟s results are thus indicative of what we might expect from a liberal analysis of 
foreign policy.  The results only explain certain types of behavior that he chose 
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beforehand (i.e. he selected on the dependant variable).  In this case it is overexpansion, 
though it could be a number of different actions.  Because we should expect different 
outcomes when goals are generated from different situations, this becomes less of a 
generalizable theory of foreign policy, and becomes rather an approach to analyzing 
foreign policy.  Such an approach requires the analyst to select the best tools for any 
given situation, and there is no guarantee that the analyst will use the correct tools.  Such 
analyses lend themselves to the case study method in order to ensure that the correct 
variables are examined and explained in differing cases.  Thus we lose the simplicity of 
the realist approach while, perhaps gaining in accuracy.  
The case covered by Graham Allison is perhaps the best example to demonstrate 
how the foreign policy a state implements is determined by the model of the state that is 
employed.  The Cuban Missile Crisis fits the realist paradigm to an unparalleled extent.  
Here, regardless of the analytical tools used, one would expect to find a state acting in its 
national security interests, unfettered by outside concerns.  Yet, the three models 
employed by Allison each point to different explanation for the same event.  And in both 
the second and the third we find the options open to the leaders circumscribed by the 
organization of the state (Krasner‟s criticisms notwithstanding).  His organizational 
model in particular speaks to this when Allison, after noting how leaders had been 
working on the crisis in the White House, asks “What, specifically, could be done?” 
(Allison 1999,  225, emphasis in the original).  
For Narizny on the other hand, the leader acts as a broker of sorts between 
different interests in the state.  Unlike Snyder‟s state, here the state, or at least the leaders 
in the state, plays some role in the foreign policy output.  For Narizny, the broad strokes 
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will be determined by the dominant interest groups, but since there are now competing 
groups (for Snyder the only opposition seemed to come from a rather diffuse society, 
which is no match for the organized groups), a manager must try to accommodate the 
different groups.  The leader will then try to reach an accommodation between the 
various interest groups.   
The composition of the state again has a significant effect on the state‟s foreign 
policy.  The assumption that there are four main groups, each with a different orientation 
towards the use of force and assertiveness, requires a state that can balance between these 
groups.  This is contra-Snyder, where the state need not play such a determinative role, 
but rather seems to be more of a weathervane that points in the direction of the dominant 
groups.  Here we see a stronger state, but one which has no particular orientation.  It does 
not have a particular goal, like the realist state, but is merely functional in nature as it 
coordinates the power of the influential groups.    
Again, for methodological purposes, this is far more complex than realist theories.  
Since the outcome depends not just on the context of the state, but also on how the goals 
are created and defined, the researcher must become far more involved in explaining a 
particular outcome.  This then increases the chances that the explanation will be 
contingent on circumstances particular to that case.   
Yet the relationship between domestic institutions and foreign policy may not be 
that complex.  In fact, it may be possible to see how realist assumptions are reflected in 
domestic determinants of foreign policy.  This is especially true in regard to the 
development of domestic legal structures that reflect realist assumptions regarding the 
needs of the state.  It is the development of these structures that I will return to later. 
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CIVIL LIBERTIES 
The evolution of the liberties of citizens of the United States has been a complex 
process.  Originally, some of the authors of the Constitution did not want to include a bill 
of rights, fearing that any list of rights as written down in 1787 could be construed as the 
only rights the citizens would ever have.  Many, including Alexander Hamilton, felt that 
the prescription of powers to the national government by the Constitution was guarantee 
enough of individual liberties: 
 
I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the 
extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the 
proposed constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain 
various exceptions to powers which are not granted; and on this very 
account, would afford a colourable pretext to claim more than were 
granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no 
power to do? Why for instance, should it be said, that the liberty of the 
press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions 
may be imposed? (Federalist # 84) 
 
Hamilton and others had hoped that by not giving specific grants of powers to the 
government that this would be interpreted to mean that the government would not be able 
to engage in activities that are not specifically stated.  Despite Hamilton‟s fears, a Bill of 
Rights was adopted, and the courts, especially in the 20
th
 century, have shown a general 
trend towards expanding and protecting individual liberties.   
For example, in the area of free speech, in the Supreme Court‟s first decision 
regarding the issue, the court concluded that First Amendment free speech rights do not 
protect all speech.  Instead, the protections are dependent upon the context in which the 
speech is made.  Any speech that interferes with the government‟s job to enforce laws or 
keep citizens safe is not protected.  Thus, “the most stringent protection of free speech 
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” 
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(Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 51).  However, the corollary to this analysis is that any 
speech that does not present a “clear and present danger” is protected.  What matters is 
the context and whether such speech inhibits the government from pursuing one of their 
constitutionally mandated duties: 
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in 
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present 
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a 
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is 
at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a 
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as 
men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any 
constitutional right. (Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. (1919) 47, 51) 
 
In 1969 the courts would go even further in defining what speech is protected by 
claiming that the only speech not protected by the first amendment is that speech which is 
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or 
produce such action” (Brandenberg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. (1969) 444, 447) (emphasis added).  
The immediacy of any speech to actions the government is supposed to regulate or 
prevent clearly indicates that the right of individuals to be free from unnecessary 
government interference is a paramount goal for the court. 
Even during times of conflict and war, the courts have held that the government, 
and more specifically the executive branch, is bound to act within certain constraints.  In  
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (343 U.S. 579 (1952)) the Supreme Court 
invalidated President Truman‟s seizure of domestic steel mills without an explicit grant 
of authority from Congress.  President Truman believed that a strike by mill workers 
would have harmed the war effort in Korea, and took control of the mills from the private 
owners.  The court, although divided in their reasoning, held in a 6-3 decision that even 
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his wide ranging authority as commander-in-chief did not authorize the President to take 
control of private resources within the United States.  To do so would open the door to 
government intervention and regulation of all aspects of domestic life: 
That seems to be the logic of an argument tendered at our bar - that the 
President having, on his own responsibility, sent American troops abroad 
derives from that act "affirmative power" to seize the means of producing 
a supply of steel for them. To quote, "Perhaps the most forceful 
illustration of the scope of Presidential power in this connection is the fact 
that American troops in Korea, whose safety and effectiveness are so 
directly involved here, were sent to the field by an exercise of the 
President's constitutional powers." Thus, it is said, he has invested himself 
with "war powers."  
I cannot foresee all that it might entail if the Court should indorse this 
argument. Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of a 
war is entrusted only to Congress. Of course, a state of war may in fact 
exist without a formal declaration. But no doctrine that the Court could 
promulgate would seem to me more sinister and alarming than that a 
President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and 
often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal 
affairs of the country by his own commitment of the Nation's armed forces 
to some foreign venture. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (343 
U.S. 579, 642) emphasis added 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning reflects that of earlier decisions, that the citizen’s of the 
United States are to be protected from unnecessary intrusion from the government, even 
in times of conflict. 
More immediately connected to the 9/11 attacks, the subsequent military actions 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the more general „war on terror,‟ the court has handed down 
decisions that likewise place restrictions on how the government may act, even in times 
of potential threats.  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (542 U.S. 507 (2004)), the court ruled in the 
case of an American citizen, Yaser Esam Hamdi, who had been detained as an "illegal 
enemy combatant."  In this case, Hamdi had been apprehended by Afghani forces and 
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turned over to American authorities, who designated him an illegal enemy combatant.  As 
such, the Bush administration claimed that Congress had given the executive branch, and 
the President in particular, the power to declare even American citizens illegal enemy 
combatants.  The administration claimed that the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military 
Force Act (AUMF) was a congressional authorization of power, allowing the President to 
"use all necessary and appropriate force" against those "nations, organizations, or 
persons" that had "planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the September 11 attacks in 
the United States.  The administration claimed that, under the AUMF, individuals 
apprehended in the course of carrying out these powers were ineligible for the protections 
other citizens are automatically entitled to by the Constitution because to do so would, in 
effect, interfere with the government‟s ability to execute these powers. Thus, even 
citizens like Hamdi were not entitled to any legal considerations nor did they have the 
ability to challenge their detention in court through habeas corpus and other due process 
proceedings.   
Hamdi claimed the opposite: that as a U.S. citizen, he could not be denied such 
rights.  The Supreme Court agreed and ruled in 2004 that as an American citizen, Hamdi 
could not be denied his constitutional right to due process in challenging his detention.  
Though the justices disagreed in how far due process restricted the ability of the 
government to carry out it‟s duties, eight of the justices concluded that even under 
potentially threatening conditions the government still must respect the liberties of U.S. 
citizens. 
While the court agreed that “There is no bar to this Nation's holding one of its 
own citizens as an enemy combatant” they believed that  
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it is equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values that 
this country holds dear or to the privilege that is American citizenship. It is 
during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our Nation's 
commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times 
that we must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which 
we fight abroad. (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (542 U.S. 507, 532 (2004)) 
 
In order to prevent what the court termed "the risk of erroneous deprivation", the 
court thus concluded that the 2001 AUMF does not allow the President to detain 
indefinitely citizens, holding that “that a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his 
classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his 
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a 
neutral decisionmaker”. 
It is important to note that in reaching this conclusion, the court explicitly 
weighed the need of the government to prosecute a war without undue restraint against 
the right of a citizen who might be threatened by the power that the government could 
wield in carrying out its responsibilities.  In finding that citizens could challenge their 
detention, the Supreme Court believed “it unlikely that this basic process will have the 
dire impact on the central functions of warmaking” that are inherent in the national 
government, and that  
while the full protections that accompany challenges to detentions in other 
settings may prove unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy-combatant 
setting, the threats to military operations posed by a basic system of 
independent review are not so weighty as to trump a citizen's core rights to 
challenge meaningfully the Government's case and to be heard by an 
impartial adjudicator. (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)) 
 
However, this case is also illustrative of the fact that the executive constantly 
seeks to expand their power, and reads laws and the Constitution in such a way as to 
justify such an expansion of power.  Every President since George Washington has, 
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especially in the realm of foreign policy, claimed the power to conduct actions not 
specifically forbidden in the Constitution.  Presidents thus claim they are justified 
through “the silences of the Constitution.  He finds a general power to conduct foreign 
relations for the nation.  Then he assumes that whatever had not been expressly assigned 
to Congress is to be exercised by the executive” (Pious 1979, 333).  This process is 
reflected in the evolution of the legal powers of the executive to conduct foreign policy. 
FOREIGN POLICY POWERS 
Over the course of the history of the United States several legal institutions 
regarding the role of the President in foreign affairs have evolved that reflect the concerns 
that the framers of the Constitution had in regard to protecting the nation.  There are 
several sources that Presidents have invoked in order to justify an expansive role of the 
executive.  
The Constitution: Commander-in Chief  
Although the framers of the Constitution desired to create a system where each 
branch would be able to „check‟ the power of the other branches and „balance‟ the power 
between them, the President‟s authority as Commander-in-Chief still contains a wide 
ranging grant of power to the President.  The decision to go to war was left in the hands 
of the more representative branch because the framer‟s felt that war was such a weighty 
issue that the citizenry must be involved in the process, lest a situation as had happened 
in England should occur, where the Executive had the power to declare war and pay for 
it.  Thus, in Federalist 69 Alexander Hamilton observes that power of the “British king 
extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies” 
 16 
allowing one person or part of the government have the ability to plan and conduct war 
without consideration by the public.  Hamilton goes on to point out that in the 
Constitution under consideration, this power would be divided, since the powers over war 
and the budget “would appertain to the legislature,”  while the ability to prosecute the war 
would be left with the President. 
 The framer‟s corrective to the potential abuse of power inherent in having a single 
person in charge of a nation‟s war-making abilities was not meant to curtail the 
government‟s ability to defend the country, however.  Even at the time the framer‟s knew 
that in order to defend the country from surprise attacks, the ability to command a 
military on short notice was necessary.  Even the noted Congressional scholar Louis 
Fisher, in arguing that framers desired an enhanced role of Congressional power over the 
executive in matters of war, observed that  
The one exception to this pattern of legislative control was the discretion 
left to the president to take certain defensive actions.  The early draft 
empowered Congress to “make war.”  Charles Pinckney objected that 
legislative proceedings “were too slow” for the safety of the country in an 
emergency, because he expected Congress to meet but once a year.  
Madison and Elbridge Gerry moved to inset “declare” for “make,” leaving 
the president with “the power to repel sudden attacks.”  Their motion 
carried.  The duty to repel sudden attacks represented an emergency 
measure that permitted the president to take actions necessary to resist 
sudden attacks either against the mainland of the United States or against 
American troops abroad. (Fisher 2000, 9-10) 
 
 This belief that the leading role of the Commander-in-Chief is to protect the 
United States can trace its development over the course of the history of the United States 
in many different settings.  Legally, the Supreme Court has noted in various permutations 
the idea that “It is 'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest is more 
compelling than the security of the Nation.” (Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981)) .  
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During his interview with David Frost, President Nixon articulated a belief that the 
President could in fact undertake actions that might in other circumstances be illegal, if 
these actions were meant to protect the country: 
FROST: Pulling some of our discussions together, as it were; speaking of 
the Presidency and in an interrogatory filed with the Church Committee, 
you stated, quote, "It's quite obvious that there are certain inherently 
government activities, which, if undertaken by the sovereign in protection 
of the interests of the nation's security are lawful, but which if undertaken 
by private persons, are not." What, at root, did you have in mind there? 
 
NIXON: Well, what I, at root I had in mind I think was perhaps much 
better stated by Lincoln during the War between the States. Lincoln said, 
and I think I can remember the quote almost exactly, he said, "Actions 
which otherwise would be unconstitutional, could become lawful if 
undertaken for the purpose of preserving the Constitution and the Nation." 
 
In this matter the Supreme Court had ruled earlier that, in pursuit of the defense of the 
country, the President was still required to act within the bounds of the Constitution, but 
despite this there could be times where national security concerns would trump the needs 
of justice.  Thus, in admonishing the Nixon administration‟s withholding of documents 
from congressional investigations, the Supreme Court noted that  
Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive 
national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that 
even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential 
communications is significantly diminished by production of such material 
for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court will be 
obliged to provide. ( U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706, emphasis added). 
 
The very clear assumption that the phrase “Absent a claim . . .”  rests upon is that 
the President indeed has special prerogatives in matters of national security.  Though the 
Constitution itself is silent in what duties and responsibilities the title Commander in 
Chief encompasses (see Pious, 1979 for a discussion on the executive‟s use of the 
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“silences of the Constitution” to justify expanded powers) there is little doubt that the 
President is vested with the power to protect the country and its citizens. 
The ‘Sole Organ’ Doctrine 
  
The Sole Organ Doctrine of the executive maintains that through the President‟s 
responsibility to conduct foreign relations and be responsible for national security, the 
President may act with few active constraints by the legislative or judicial branches.  The 
responsibility for these actions is found in Article II, section 2, where the framers wrote 
that the President “ shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall 
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls . . .” 
 Thus, many scholars (and all Presidents) claim that the President has an „inherent‟ 
exclusive power that derives from his position in the government.   This doctrine has 
found a new life in the post 9/11 era as the White House has attempted to expand its 
authority in the national security arena.  In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, 
the Justice department wrote that  
We conclude that the Constitution vests the President with the plenary 
authority, as Commander in Chief and the sole organ of the Nation in its 
foreign relations, to use military force abroad—especially in response to 
grave national emergencies created by sudden, unforeseen attacks on the 
people and territory of the United States” (United States Department of 
Justice 2001).   
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Even a more limited reading of this doctrine again leaves the President with a 
large amount of discretionary power in regards to foreign relations and national security, 
and the trend has been towards a greater rather than lesser reading. 
 The origin of the phrase, and the idea behind it, are not new.  It was first used by 
John Marshal in the House of Representatives in 1800 (Fisher 2007, 140).  Its oft-
referenced meaning can be found in the Supreme Court decision United States v. Curtiss-
Wright (299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)), where the Supreme Court outlined the near absolute 
power of the executive to conduct foreign affairs:  
Not only, as we have shown, is the federal power over external affairs in 
origin and essential character different from that over internal affairs, but 
participation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. In this 
vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold 
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a 
representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent 
of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the 
Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. 
(United States v. Curtiss-Wright 299 U.S. 304, 319) 
 
Later, in recognizing the extent of the executive‟s power, the Supreme Court attempted to 
elucidate the intent of the framers when they wrote the Constitution and concluded that 
the framers had in fact modeled the American foreign policy apparatus on that of the 
British monarchy!  In this case, the Supreme Court determined that in fact the President 
does possess „plenary‟ powers to conduct foreign relations, and that the President was not 
dependent on a delegation of power from the legislature. 
Further, the history of the legislative branch displayed, in the court‟s opinion, a 
regular pattern of deference to the executive in the conduct of foreign affairs.  The court 
concluded that “The uniform, long-continued and undisputed legislative practice just 
disclosed rests upon an admissible view of the Constitution which, even if the practice 
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found far less support in principle than we think it does, we should not feel at liberty at 
this late day to disturb. “ (United States v. Curtiss-Wright 299 U.S. 304, 329).  For the 
court to say that they do not feel compelled to overturn such a well established practice, 
even if such a practice has „far less support in principle than we think it does‟ is truly a 
monumental statement.  The court, in essence, seems to be saying that the matter at hand, 
foreign relations, is far more important than constitutional principles, and that what has 
been shown to work during the history of the country should be given priority over those 
principles.  Thus the trend has been towards a more expansive view of the President‟s 
power in foreign policy at the expense of the other branches of government. 
The Constitution: Executive Powers and the Oath of Office 
 In addition to the specific grants of power given to the President as Commander-
in-Chief and as chief foreign policy maker, it should also be recognized that the President 
is imbued with general executive authority to carry out actions in the interests of the 
United States.  Indeed, the oath of office as specified in Article II, section 1, of the 
Constitution reads: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the 
Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”  The fact that the words 
„protect‟ and „defend‟ figure so prominently in the oath further gives weight to the notion 
that the President, in carrying out his duties as President, above and beyond all other 
duties, is to insure that the country‟s security is provided for. 
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United Nations Charter 
 In negotiating and executing treaties as part of the President‟s job, the President 
finds even further support in his duties to protect the country in Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter.  This portion of the U.N. Charter specifically gives counties that fall 
under attack the right to defend themselves: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of 
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the 
authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
 
By noting that self-defense is an „inherent‟ right, the United Nations Charter is 
specifically saying that counties are automatically justified in protecting themselves 
rather than relying on any outside justification, such as the charter itself.  As one 
prominent scholar noted: 
Many writers have asserted that the use of inherent in Article 51 clearly 
establishes a right of states to use force in self-defense and that Article 51 
does not imply an impairment of that right until the Security Council (or 
the General Assembly) has acted.  Such a view, shared by the present 
writer, holds therefore that the right of self-defense is not at all based on 
the Charter but is a normal right of states under international law.  (Von 
Glahn 1992, 131)(emphasis in original) 
 
Since the President is responsible for carrying out treaties, and since the U.N. Charter 
specifies that states are justified in protecting themselves even without international 
agreement.  The President can legitimately claim international justification for his actions 
as well as domestic Constitutional support.  In effect, the international agreement says 
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that no international agreement is needed to defend oneself, giving the President the 
ability to defend the country without the need for international approval. 
CONCERNS OVER CURRENT POLICY 
 The preceding discussion makes clear that the trend in both domestic and 
international practice is that self defense is a primary responsibility of a state, and that a 
country is to have wide latitude to defend itself and its citizens.  There is, of course, the 
open question of what constitutes self-defense.  Those who favor a limited executive 
might, for example, favor a reactive policy that limits the President to responding to the 
actions of others.  In contrast, another perspective argues that a state can be more 
aggressive in its notion of self defense.  This latter notion seems to fit better with the 
evolution of the legal and constitutional institutions around U.S. foreign policy.  And it is 
this line of reasoning that the current administration is attempting to promulgate in its 
justification of the use of drones in foreign policy. 
 Presidents, as a matter of history, are not reactive.  In fact, the form of 
government that the framers created in Philadelphia in 1787 is predicated on the belief 
that those who are in positions of power will not limit themselves, but rather will attempt 
to further expand their own abilities and those of their office.  The discussion of how 
much power the President should have is a necessary one, but differs from the question 
currently under consideration, which is whether the President can claim to have the 
power to order the killing of an American citizen in the interests of national security.   
  The current policy as outlined by Harold Koh, the Legal Advisor of the 
Department of State, builds upon the existing framework of Presidential authority in 
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national security matters to make the claim that the President does indeed have such 
authority.  In a speech to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International 
Law on March 25, 2010, Harold Koh stated the administration‟s rationale behind the use 
of unmanned aerial vehicles - commonly referred to as drones -  to attack those persons 
who are deemed a threat to the United States.  The legality of the use of drones has been 
called into question by some who question the legality of using methods that may target 
individuals away from traditional battlefields.   Should some of those individuals be 
American citizens, whether they are specifically targeted or not, be killed in such an 
attack, clearly an argument could be made that their rights had been violated by the 
American President while he was carrying out his duties as President. 
 More specifically, The American Civil Liberties Union filed a Freedom of 
Information Request with the U.S. Government seeking  
information about the legal basis in domestic, foreign, and international 
law for the use of drones to conduct targeted killings.  We request 
information regarding the rules and standards that the Armed Forces and 
the CIA use to determine when and where these weapons may be used, the 
targets they may be used against, and the processes in place to decide 
whether their use is legally permissable in particular circumstances, 
especially in the face of anticipated civilian casualties.  We also seek 
information about how these rules and standards are enforced.  (American 
Civil Liberties Union 2010, 2) 
 
The concerns of the A.C.L.U. are twofold: 1), they are concerned that the use of drones in 
targeted killings may produce heavy civilian casualties the United States is legally 
responsible to try and avoid; 2) the concern arises that targets that these drones are used 
against are not legitimate military targets but are illegitimate political targets, and that the 
United States is engaging in acts of political assassination.  If one of these targets is an 
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American citizen, then clearly the concern is that if he is killed, it would have occurred 
extra-judicially, without the due process and other rights a citizen is entitled to. 
   Since then, reports have surfaced in the media that have added a third dimension 
to these concerns: a natural-born citizen of the United States, Anwar al-Awlaki, has been 
targeted for killing by the U.S. government.  Although this had been a hypothetical 
possibility at the time that the A.C.L.U. made its request, the issue is now very real.   The 
actions that the United States government is engaging in will deny a U.S. citizens of one 
of his civil liberties, specifically his right to „due process‟ from the government whenever 
the government tries to deprive him of his life or liberty. 
THE ADMINISTRATION’S JUSTIFICATION 
 The argument made by Harold Koh in March tried to address these two concerns 
directly.  When combined with the general trend towards greater executive power, Koh‟s 
reasoning tries to give the President the power to order such killings.  What is striking 
about this situation is that while the President, when acting in accordance with his duties 
to protect the country and its citizens, appears to have the unfettered and unilateral power 
to order the killing of an American citizen.  However, should the President attempt to act 
against Anwar al-Awlaki in his capacity of executing the laws of the United States (i.e. 
pursuing criminal charges), then the President would still need to act in accordance with 
the due process rights that any American is entitled to. 
 In addressing these concerns, Harold Koh first referred to what he called “The 
Law of 9/11” which appears to be an appeal to the dangers that the United States faces 
after the 9/11 attacks.   In differentiating between the pre- and post-September 11 eras, 
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the administration is trying to draw attention to current dangers that didn‟t exist (or at 
least we were unaware of) prior to the attacks: 
We live in a time, when, as you know, the United States finds itself 
engaged in several armed conflicts. As the President has noted, one 
conflict, in Iraq, is winding down. He also reminded us that the conflict in 
Afghanistan is a “conflict that America did not seek, one in which we are 
joined by forty-three other countries in an effort to defend ourselves and 
all nations from further attacks.” In the conflict occurring in Afghanistan 
and elsewhere, we continue to fight the perpetrators of 9/11: a non-state 
actor, al-Qaeda (as well as the Taliban forces that harbored al-Qaeda). 
(Koh 2010)  
 
From this Koh concludes that because of the ongoing hostilities that the nation faces, the 
President may take actions consonant with his responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief.  
Not only are such actions justifiable, they are required.  
 Interestingly the administration‟s first justification is not in the inherent power or 
constitutional duty of the President to safeguard the country.  Instead, Koh first makes an 
appeal to international law, followed by domestic justifications:  
The United States agrees that it must conform its actions to all applicable 
law. As I have explained, as a matter of international law, the United 
States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and 
associated forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks, and may use 
force consistent with its inherent right to self-defense under international 
law. As a matter of domestic law, Congress authorized the use of all 
necessary and appropriate force through the 2001 Authorization for Use of 
Military Force (AUMF). These domestic and international legal 
authorities continue to this day. (Koh 2010) 
 
In all likelihood, this is intentional.  The primary justification for the use of force in 
international law is defensive in nature, to preserve a county‟s existence in the face of a 
hostile force.  In the case of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the use of force is neither being 
employed under the threat of the country being overrun by an equal force, nor is the 
territory of the United States and citizens under perpetual threat.  The attacks of 9/11, as 
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horrific as they were, and subsequent attempts at terrorism have placed small parts of the 
population under threat of violence for comparatively limited amounts of time.  Contrast 
this with the threat the British were under for years during World War II or the threat the 
U.S. might have been under has the Allies lost.  Under the current situation, the overall 
threats might not rise to the level necessary for the United States or any other country to 
be justified in taking actions under international law. 
 While the administration starts with international law of self defense as a 
justification for its action, it is in the domestic realm where we can see the power of the 
presidency be exercised and expanded.  In establishing the right of the United States to 
use force, Koh went beyond a reactive notion of self defense and asserted that “the 
United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated 
forces, in response to the horrific 9/11 attacks” (Koh 2010).  The structure of this 
sentence is important.  Koh and the administration are arguing not only self defense.  In 
addition to that, the administration is stating that we are in, if not an all out war, then 
something akin to it.  The United States is not simply looking to defend itself and 
dissuade and prevent an attack on the United States, but instead is engaged in active 
combat with a foe intent on harming us.   
 Note that there is no discussion on whether al-Qauda or the Taliban could actually 
defeat the United States.  If this assertion was made one would be tempted to ask „How?‟.  
Surely these groups cannot take over the country nor bring about its demise.  Instead, 
what the administration is trying to do is commingle the justification for self defense and 
the justification to fight a more aggressive military campaign.  Because of the 
comparatively limited threat posed by the county‟s enemies (WMDs notwithstanding) 
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self defense alone might not justify aggressive foreign policy and military actions.  So the 
administration is trying to „hitch‟ the rationale for a more aggressive posture onto the self 
defense justification.   In the face of a perceived threat the executive claims more power 
than it might otherwise be allowed to have by the Constitution.  Given the general 
deference shown by the courts in past instances, this is a sound strategy. 
 In essence, the administration is trying to elide over the justification for 
aggressive action by suggesting that we are in a conflict of self defense, which is allowed 
under international law.  Then, the administration seeks to use the Authorization for the 
Use of Military Force (AUMF) from Congress, passed in the wake of the September 11 
attacks, as justification for actions that go beyond reactionary defensive measures, but are 
taken for defensive purposes.  Actions such as targeting individuals for killing would fall 
into this category.  They are individuals who are undoubtedly trying to cause harm to 
American territory and citizens, but are not necessarily the threats envisioned to states 
under international law. 
 Because these individuals do represent threats of a kind that require direct action 
rather than defensive reactions, Koh continues by outlining not why such individuals 
should be targeted, since that is covered by earlier justifications, but how they will be 
targeted: 
 Of course, whether a particular individual will be targeted in a 
particular location will depend upon considerations specific to each case, 
including those related to the imminence of the threat, the sovereignty of 
the other states involved, and the willingness and ability of those states to 
suppress the threat the target poses. In particular, this Administration has 
carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting operations to ensure that 
these operations are conducted consistently with law of war principles, 
including: 
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 First, the principle of distinction, which requires that attacks be 
limited to military objectives and that civilians or civilian objects shall not 
be the object of the attack;  
 and Second, the principle of proportionality, which prohibits 
attacks that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury 
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, that 
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated. (Koh 2010) 
 
 It is interesting to note that this reasoning mirrors very closely the argument that 
Michael Walzer made in his seminal work Just and Unjust Wars (Walzer 1992).  In his 
view, noncombatants, while never legitimate targets, may be subject to what he calls the 
„double effect‟:  “Double effect is defensible, I want to argue, only when the two 
outcomes are a product of a double intention: first, that the “good” be achieved; second, 
that the foreseeable evil be reduced as far as possible” (Walzer 1992, 157).  What he is 
saying is that in combat, states have an obligation to balance the good that will come 
from the military action against the probable or foreseeable negative effect it will have on 
non-combatants.   
But this is very similar to Koh‟s metrics of distinction and proportionality.  Under 
both standards, an attack on a „low-value‟ target that imperils many noncombatants is, or 
should be, strictly prohibited.  On the other hand, one could make an argument if the 
value of the target was high enough, then a more risky attack could be permissible.  What 
is important to note is that in neither case is the question of the target addressed.  By 
addressing only the concerns over whether noncombatant are put in unnecessary danger, 
the administration is trying to ignore the question of who is targeted.  By focusing on the 
question of how to attack a target, the administration is trying to subsume the question of 
why attack a particular target into the President‟s war-making and foreign policy powers.    
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Because the administration has elided the self defense and justification of 
international law into the Executive prerogative to defend the country from harm, now 
the administration merely needs to acknowledge that in its military activities it is not 
violating any of the established restrictions on military action by abiding by provisions 
that limit, but do not stop, civilian losses.  This can even include the assassination of an 
American citizen. 
CONCLUSION 
The strategy that the current administration has engaged in to justify the use of 
unmanned drone aircraft to assassinate key terrorist targets, potentially including an 
American citizen, is one that follows from the evolution of two key strands of American 
political institutions:  the ability of the President to exercise near complete control of the 
country‟s foreign policy and war-making apparatus, and the development of individual 
liberties that put restraints on when and how the government can interfere in the lives of 
the citizens.  Although these separate strands seem to be contradictory in certain 
circumstances, in fact, as I have demonstrated, they are not.  The function of civil 
liberties is not to restrain the government unnecessarily, but to try and ensure that citizens 
are not unnecessarily abused by their government.   Thus, in theory, even when a citizen 
poses a threat to the national security of the United States, the development of both the 
foreign policy and civil liberties legal institutions of the country can allow for the 
appropriate treatment of that particular situation. 
I have argued that given the ever widening power of the executive in foreign 
policy and self defense matters, it is natural and to be expected that the government 
would make the claim that assassination of an American citizen is appropriate.  The way 
the current administration has made that argument does not allow for examination of how 
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much of a threat a person, even a citizen, is to the country.  An exploration of this 
question might lead on to conclude that such actions are not really necessary to ensure the 
security of the county.  Rather, the administration has tried to answer the question, 
associated particularly strongly with unmanned aerial drone aircraft, of how best to 
accomplish such a task, and whether it can be done without „unnecessarily‟ harming non-
combatants.  By answering that question, the government leaves the question of 
designating targets squarely in the purview of the President, which dovetails with the 
evolution of the President‟s foreign policy and war-making powers. 
To students of international relations, this episode also is an interesting 
examination of competing theories.  On the surface, this appears to be a case where 
different theories would lead one to different outcomes.  In traditional realist thought, the 
outcome in this case would be obvious, that a state will do whatever is in its interests of 
self defense.  Yet, parsimonious this explanation may be, it misses the nuanced evolution 
of the internal mechanisms of the American state.  It would not be able to explain why, 
for example, the President can exercise wide ranging powers in foreign policy, yet still be 
constrained in how it deals with it‟s citizens in most circumstances. 
A liberal analysis of the development of domestic political features, such a 
individual liberties, on the other hand, would capture this complexity, yet without an 
understanding of some of the main concerns of the founders, and of their concern over 
conflict between states.  Analyzing only one institution might lead one to conclude that 
the United States has far less power over its citizens than, in fact, it does. 
This case actually presents a situation where the best features of both liberal and 
realist theories can be introduced and usefully employed to understand the outcome.  
Through a careful understanding of the development of particular domestic institutions 
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and the application of certain realist assumptions of the international system, one can 
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